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AFTER DIVORCE:
Alternatives to
Child Support
Payments
by David L. Chambers
Professor of Law
The University of Michigan
[A couple with children separate and divorce. A court
orders one parent, typically the father, to pay child support
to the other, but the father fails to pay. This pattern repeats
itself thousands of times each year in nearly every
American state.
The state of Michigan is unusual. It collects more child
support per case from its divorced parents than any other
state. Much of this success is due to the fact that every
Michigan county has long had an agency, the Friend of the
Court, that receives all payments and oversees the entire
enforcement process, sending warnings to fathers who fall
behind. David L. Chambers, a member of the U-M Law
School faculty, undertook a study of Michigan's collection
systems to learn, among other things, why, even within
Michigan, some counties had vastly greater collections than
others.
After examining collections in 28 counties, Chambers
found that those counties that jailed large numbers of
defaulting men for contempt of court collected more than
other counties, if (but only if) they also had a wellorganized system of warnings to men who were falling

behind. Michigan's counties jail men at an awesome rate. In
some Michigan counties, one divorced father with children
in every six ends up in jail at least once for failing to pay
during the life of his court order.
Chambers also found, however, that the enforcement
process systematically led to the jailing of the men about
whom there was the greatest doubts of their capacity to pay.
Believing further that American's general propensity to jail
everyone we consider immoral is a dangerous one,
Chambers explored whether governments could create
alternatives to the current system that would produce
higher levels of payments for children without the
undesirable effects of a system that relies heavily on jailing.
Chambers' findings and conclusions are reported in a
new book Making Fathers Pay, published by the University
of Chicago Press. In the book, Chambers illustrates many of
his points through examples from one family, the Neals,
whose members he interviewed. Here is an excerpt* from
the chapter in which he explored new ways of assuring
adequate income to the children of divorced parents.]
*Excerpt " 1979 hy Davi d L. Ch amb ers
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... regardless of the system devised, custodians of small
children must either adjust to a significant decline in income
or ... find either high-paying work or a new spouse.
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Every Friday afternoon, Jerry Neal collects his paycheck
at the manager's office in the apartment complex where he
works. He cashes the check and joins others from the
maintenance crew for two or three beers at Marble Lucy's.
As the weekend passes, he may or may not remember the
thirty dollars he promised to send the Genesee Friend of the
Court. Even if he does remember, he may or may not
actually buy and mail a money order. On those Saturdays
when he does send it, there is little doubt that his action will
have been prompted in part by the desire to avoid another
jailing. Our findings suggest strongly that, if Michigan were
to abandon jailing as a collection tool while retaining the
current system that depends on payments by fathers after
they have cashed their paychecks, the state would collect
less not only from Jerry but also from many other men
under orders. Smaller collections would leave thousands of
Michigan children who live with one parent worse off
financially than they already are .
In this chapter, we consider various schemes for
obtaining money from parents before each week's paycheck
reaches their pockets. Under some schemes, money would
be collected even before the couple separates. Each scheme
has some advantages and drawbacks in relation to the
present system. Among the plans discussed, a system of
universal wage deductions seems most promising. The
others, various sorts of insurance schemes with payments
before separation, are enticing but unworkable.

Two New Approaches:
I. Mandatory Wage Deductions
The biggest money-collecting enterprise of governments
is, of course, the collection of taxes . How do they do it? In
this country, prior to World War II, the federal government
simply required all persons owing taxes to pay whatever
they owed at the end of each tax year, relying on a sense of
duty and the fear of civil suit or criminal prosecution as the
principal motivations to pay.
During World War II, the government shifted to a new
system for most individual taxpayers, requiring employers
to withhold an estimate of the taxes that would be due. The
employed taxpayer no longer made a choice about paying.
The pay-as-you-earn system has continued to the present
and all states with income taxes have followed suit.
Today, the collection of child support largely resembles
prewar tax collections. The payments men are to make are
due weekly, not annually, but the expected motivations of
duty and fear are essentially the same. Although many
states authorize the use of wage assignments to collect
support, and such assignments operate like a tax
withholding system, assignments are rarely used in more
than a small portion of cases. Moreover, in most states,
including Michigan, courts may not impose a wage
assignment except on a person already in default, and in all
states a wage assignment ends when a person ceases to
work for the employer against whom it was ordered.
Could child support collections be increased and fewer
men end up singled out for penal treatment if governments
instituted a system of mandatory deductions from wages
that followed an employee wherever he went?
If a federal system were established under which
withholding occurred from the first moment of an order and
traveled with a person wherever he took work within the
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country, the need for much of the current enforcement
system would largely disappear. To make such a system
work, the federal government would need to create a
national computerized system probably tied to the man's
Social Security number. Employers would be required to
make a check on a new employee through the Social
Security office to learn whether support payments were to
be withheld from his wages. Under such a system,
payments would be nearly perfect except by the
unemployed, the self-employed, and those able to evade the
floating wage assignment by falsifying their Social Security
numbers or by colluding with the employer. Jerry Neal, for
all his problems, has nearly always held a job. He started on
the line at General Motors. Over the years since, he has
painted houses, installed mufflers at an auto-repair shop,
and, in recent years, performed maintenance work at
apartment houses. At least in theory, under a wage
assignment scheme, Jerry would have been nearly current
in his payments instead of $18,000 in arrears. He would also
have avoided the pain, and Genesee County the expense of
three long terms in jail.
An additional advantage of the assignment system is that
it could be set up to allow judges to fix orders in terms of a
percentage of the individual's earnings. Employers in turn
would deduct the fixed percentage of the worker's earnings,
the dollar amount varying over time, just as they do with
Social Security. Today, in nearly all places, courts set a
fixed dollar amount as the order size. Although courts
currently have the power to modify an order to reflect
changes in earnings, the procedure is cumbersome and in
many places infrequently used. The consequence is that, as
men 's earnings and their children's living costs rise, the
order remains the same .
The federal legislation could also be set up to protect
workers under orders of support from such large
deductions that they are forced to live in poverty. This
protection can be achieved in part through the shift
suggested above from orders fixed in dollars to orders fixed
in percentages of earnings. It could be achieved more fully
by excluding a certain amount per hour from the wages
subject to the wage deduction, before applying the wagededuction percentage to the remainder. (The percentage
taken of the remainder wcmld than have to be higher than it
would be if the percentage were applied to the whole.) In
any event, the federal government should not set up a
system that routinely recoups money for itself by taking
money from noncustodial parents living in poverty.
Especially is this so when the United States has no great
system of income support for nondisabled single
individuals such as the low-income parent who is not living
with his minor children.
A national compulsory deduction system would,
however, have many troublesome aspects. It would be
cumbersome to administer, a fountain of details inviting
errors. Unlike income-tax withholding, deductions for child
support would be required only for certain employees.
Also, unlike income taxes, support payments would
generally have to be funneled to a recipient other than the
federal government, a process likely to take several weeks,
even months. At varying intervals, as children reached
majority, the amount to be withheld would change .
Some of these problems are not insuperable. The federal
government could speed the process of passing payments
through to the custodial parent (and to state welfare
departments) simply by starting payments to recipients
upon receiving notice that withholding had begun but
without waiting until payments were actually received.
Withholding from the noncustodial parent could continue

beyond the children's majority, if that were necessary to
recoup the money advanced.
Some other troubling aspects of a compulsory wageassignment system would not be so fully remediable. Many
people feel strongly about their right to decide for
themselves what to do with their earnings. They would
resent involuntary wage assignments for child support as
much as they would resent involuntary deductions for their
Master Charge bill, even though they could agree that it was
reprehensible not to pay. Whether seeing it as a right or an
obligation, many noncustodial parents attach importance to
their weekly act of writing a support check, viewing it as an
occasion to demonstrate their love for their children.
A wage-assignment system would also involve another
sort of federal instrusion on matters many consider private
and personal. We can appropriately worry about a federal
computer system carrying detailed information about the
failed marriages of millions of citizens. Indeed, the
employer would invariably learn through the system if his
employee was divorced or was the parent of an illegitimate
child. Today, some Friends of the Court hesitate to impose
wage assignments in cases in which they fear that the father
is likely to be fired by an employer who either does not
want the bother of making an additional deduction or thinks
ill of persons who are divorced or the parents of a
"bastard." In Genesse County, General Motors cooperated
in full with the Friend of the Court with regard to wage
assignments for its blue-collar workers but regarded a wage
assignment as a blot on the record for its white-collar
workers . (The Friends of the Court were not badly hobbled
by this odd bit of class bias. They simply informed the
defaulting white-collar worker at General Motors that if he
didn' t begin regular payments they had a wage assignment
ready to mail in.) The problem of employer resistance could
well continue under the system proposed here.
For all these reasons, it is easily understandabl e- why only
a bare majority of the Friends of the Court indicated in a
mailed survey that they would favor a change in Michigan
law to permit the imposition of a wage assignment at the
moment the support order first takes effect and before any
arrearage develops. There was no uniform enthusiasm
despite the fact that nearly all the Friends of the Court are
strongly committed to improving collections of support. All,
I believe, favored wage assignments for men substantially
in arrears, for these men had lost their just claim to control
the disposition of their earnings.
In the end, however, the issue when contemplating a
mandatory deduction system is not the drawbacks of such a
system in the abstract. Rather, it is whether a system of
automatic wage assignments would be worse than the sinbased system that we have now-the system in which we
dangle before men the opportunity not to pay and, then ,
when men respond to the opportunity, clap them into jail.
If state and federal governments remain committed to
compelling long-absent parents to support their children
and remain determined to enforce the obligation
aggressively, I for one would choose the compulsorydeduction system over the system now found in Michigan. It
would be my preference not so much because it would
almost certainly lead to even higher collections than
Michigan obtains today but because of the doubts I have
expressed about the justness of a jail-based system and
about the atmosphere that system creates. The choice may
seem easier because the new system does not exist. It is,
however, hard to believe that a new system, however
intrusive, could be as distasteful as one that depends
heavily on imprisonment and the fear of imprisonment.
Readers who have doubts in this regard should turn
themselves in for a weekend at the nearest county jail.

II. Insurance Schemes
Choosing between child support squeezed out under pain
of imprisonment and child support removed from wages
through an all-knowing federal system may seem like a
choice between death by fire and death by ice. Neither has
much appeal. Are there other workable alternatives? The
opposite pole of our current individualized system of
support would be a purely public system of welfare
benefits. Noncustodial parents would not be compelled to
support their children at all (except through their payment
of income taxes, as for any other taxpayers) . The custodial
parent, if in need, would turn to the public assistance
system for support. No reimbursement would be sought
from the other parent.
Such an alternative would have little appeal in this
country. It would be acceptable only if Americans came to
view all children as everyone's children, with parents no
more responsible than anyone else for the support of their
own children. It is hardly likely that Americans will ever
see the children of a divorced bank president as
everybody's children.
The private system and the welfare system do not,
however, represent the full range of possibilities. In
between there are some well-developed alternatives that
may be loosely grouped under the heading "insurance," for
dealing with events such as death or automobile accidents
that, like divorce, are both predictable in their incidence
and catastrophic in their financial consequences. Under
such schemes, a pool of funds is created in advance of an
event so that it is available when the event occurs. Let us
consider briefly three forms of "divorce" or "marriage"
insurance, each with familiar analogues, to see whether
they offer promise as substitutes for, or supplements to, the
current system.
Private Voluntary Insurdnce
People buy life insurance to provide for their families
upon their deaths. Couples might similarly buy marriage
insurance to provide for their children in the event of their
separation. Insurance companies would offer policies to
couples who wanted them, set premiums, and then if a
couple separated, pay a benefit, perhaps in periodic form,
to the custodial spouse . How much would be paid and for
how long could all be matters of choice for individuals (or
the insurers) and would affect the size of the premium . Just
as is the case with term life insurance, if a sufficient
number of couples bought the policy and the insured event
befell only a small portion of the participating couples,
premiums could be kept small in relation to the benefits
paid to those families with claims.
As a scheme for dealing with the problem of inadequate
income for single parents, a system of private voluntary
insurance may sound appealing but it is wholly
unworkable. As long as it is voluntary, how many American
couples, most of whom consider themselves living at the
margin, would choose to participate? Very few, and those
who would participate would be likely to be those who felt
their marriages in greatest risk. If the latter problem, known
as "adverse selection" in the insurance business, occurred,
it would mean that within the pool participating the ratio of
divorcing couples to other couples would be higher than in
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the population as a whole and thus that premiums would
have to be higher than if the pool contained a random
representation of couples. The premium cost is a serious
problem, but even if the premium were quite small-which
it could not be-the problem with voluntary insurance
would be that it is almost certain that those parents in
greatest need would not be participants.
Private insurance carriers are unlikely to be interested in
carrying divorce insurance even for well-heeled couples.
They have indeed already shown little interest in
suggestions by women's groups that they carry it. Apart
from the fact that some carriers may regard divorce as a
nasty business, they are likely to be greatly bothered by the
problem of adverse selection. The problem is aggravated by
the fact that the insured event is within the control of the
insured couple. In some ways, such insurance would be like
a property insurance policy that explicitly permitted the
owner to collect even when he intentionally burned down
his own plant. The very existence of marriage insurance
might cause some couples to separate who would otherwise
stay together. The financial security promised by such
insurance would be an attractive feature for women who
feel trapped in unhappy marriages, but it would be a most
unattractive feature to insurers.
For all these reasons, the only place voluntary insurance
would seem to have would be as self-insurance for a few
farsighted, well-off people. This would hardly be insurance
at all; it would be like a savings account in which a couple
would simply salt away money. If they separated, the fund,
grown over time, would be available to them. If they did not
separate, the money would still be there for their middle
years or for their retirement. Many couples have something
slightly comparable to such a plan today without thinking of
it in those terms, for in most states savings during a
marriage will, of course, be divided between the spouses at
divorce .
Compulsory Insurance Plans

Today, in nearly all states, the continued validity of a
person's license to drive an automobile is conditioned on
his carrying liability insurance to protect those who may be
injured in an accident. Could a somewhat comparable form
of child support insurance be devised as a condition to
marriage? Each couple as a condition of marriage would be
required to produce proof of insurance, just as they are
required to provide proof of a blood test. They would then
be required to continue the insurance throughout their
marriage or for some fixed period of years. The premiums
would be set forth in such a way as to provide adequate
income after divorce for those who become single parents.
If such a system could work, consider the virtues it would
have: it would reach all married couples with children, not
just the few who would choose to participate in a voluntary
plan; it would provide income to a custodial parent after
divorce in a form (unlike welfare) that would clearly be
seen as a contractual or legal right. Payments would come
without the unpredictability and unreliability of periodic
post-separation payments by the father. Even if some
periodic payments by fathers were required after divorce,
the insurance scheme would provide a valuable
supplement-if it worked. But it won't.
In the first place, it would not reach the illegitimate child
at all. Unless every young person had to purchase
intercourse insurance or a high-priced intercourse license,
there would be no period of premium payment before the
insured event (a child living with a single parent) would
have occurred.
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Even assuming that every married couple participated,
with benefits paid only to custodial parents after divorce,
the premiums would have to be very high. There are simply
a lot of minor children of divorced persons, in an era in
which one out of every four or five couples with minor
ldren divorce before the children reach their majority. To
be able to pay three thousand dollars a year to each
divorced parent with two children, and six thousand dollars
to each parent with three or more, all married couples in
the country would have to pay premiums of at least $450 a
year throughout their marriage, even after they reached
their fifties. To most American families, $450 will seem a lot
of money. And forty-eight hundred dollars for a woman
with two children would still leave her living in poverty.
Considerations of fairness might well force the premiums
even higher. Legislatures might consider it inequitable to
require insurance to be carried by couples who had no
children, couples in which the woman was beyond
childbearing age, and couples whose children had all
reached their majority. Requiring older couples to pay for
insurance would be like requiring a person to continue to
pay automobile insurance after he had given up driving. If
the pool of required contributors were limited to younger
married couples who had a minor child, premiums for those
included in the plan would have to be raised substantially
higher- doubled or tripled perhaps.
The problem with compulsory insurance lies not only in
the size of premiums but also in their collection. What do
we do to the couple who cannot or will not pay the
premium? Denying the right to marry to those who cannot
afford to pay would surely violate the Constitution. Jailing
after marriage those later refusing to pay would pose many
of the same problems of jailing for nonpayment after
divorce. Indeed jailing during marriage may seem even
more dubious, if the couple is happily united, living with
children, confident in their capacity to hold the marriage
together. Collections could, of course, be made through
payroll deductions in the manner of the mandatory wage
assignment system discussed above. If they were, the
system would closely resemble an expansion of the Social
Security system, an idea to which we now turn .
Expanding the Social Security System
Yet another form of insurance that is familar to all of us is
the public insurance known as Social Security. Today, for
the overwhelming majority of workers in this country and
their dependents, the Social Security system provides
benefits to those who reach a certain age or become
disabled, as well as to the survivors of those who die. The
benefit scheme, evolving since its creation forty years ago,
is extremely complex. The benefits paid depend upon the
length of time a worker has made payments prior to the
occurrence of the insured event and upon his earnings
during the period he was making payments. Funds for the
benefits are obtained by wage deductions from employees
matched by an equal contribution from employers. Today,
in 1978, the rate is 6.05 percent of the employee's wages,
with an additional 6.05 percent paid by the employer.
It would be possible to add the event of becoming a single
parent to the list of covered incidents. Since "singleparentness" is not an event likely to befall workers over a
certain age, contributions might not be required from
workers over, say, the age of fifty.
If the contribution rate for both employers and
employees were to be substantially raised, a sufficient
amount of money could be obtained to pay benefits

approximately equal to those obtained through the
compulsory insurance scheme discussed above, although
pegged in some way to the parents' actual level of
contributions.
Such a scheme would have several attractive attributes.
For those covered, the problem of collecting premiums is
largely cured : if a person works, he or she makes payments.
The current scheme of individual collections after divorce
could be largely scrapped, depending on the level of
support one wished to assure. Moreover, the current
welfare system could be dramatically cut back. Workers
whose children today receive payments through the AFDC
system would support their children instead through Social
Security benefits. In turn, payments through the Social
Security system would be largely free of the stigma
attached to the receipt of welfare. They would be free for
what most Americans would consider the right reason : that
is, the children would be supported in a manner that bore a
relation to actual contribution from the parents.
Such a scheme, however, would not reach all children
living with single parents . At the psychological heart of the
current Social Security system is the notion that it provides
benefits only to those who have made contributions over a
certain period. Most illegitimate children whose parents do
not live together and a significant portion of children of
divorce have young parents neither of whom has long
participated in the labor force and neither of whom would
today be eligible for full benefits on becoming disabled.
Indeed many illegitimate children have parents who have
never participated in the labor force at all . While a very
short period of contributions might be justified on the
ground that, with this form of covered event (unlike death,
disability, or old age], the probability is high that one or
both parents will have many more years as contributors to
the fund , it would do violence to the central concept of
Social Security that many people have by providing
benefits in some cases in which neither parent has made
any contribution.
Much more fundamental objections can be raised to the
scheme than that it does not reach everyone. Many feel the
Social Security system is already overburdened. Congress
has recently increased both the rate of the tax and the
income levels up to which the taxes are paid. Workers feel
the cost of the system when it reduces their take-home pay.
They would be likely to acknowledge that the additional
deduction was worth it to them only if they perceived
themselves as one of those significantly at risk of needing
the benefits. Many workers would readily admit the risk of
death, disability, and old age but would not consider
themselves at all likely to become a parent of a child living
with a single parent. They would object to such an
alteration of the Social Security system just as they would
object to the mandatory "divorce insurance" scheme we
discussed earlier. The objectors would include not merely
older couples but also the millions of young single people
who either abstain altogether from sexual intercourse or, if
they engage in it, invariably use reliable contraceptive
devices.
In addition, death, old age, and disability are seen by
most Americans as largely free of fault. Though there are
exceptions, people do not generally die or cripple
themselves either on purpose or in ways that make us think
ill of them . Divorce is different. To many, it has the flavor of
sin or at least of insufficient resolve to live up to a solemn
commitment. Even more frequently viewed as sinful is the
conception of a child out of wedlock by a woman not living
with the father of the child . The compulsory system I

suggest would require some people to support others they
view as irresponsible. Indeed they would see the system as
encouraging people to act irresponsibly.
If the Social Security system were expanded to insure
against the event of single parenthood, the entire system
might thus become tainted, whereas one of its signal
features in this country has been that its recipients have
always been permitted to feel that they were receiving
payments that they deserved for reasons that they need not
feel badly about. This feature is one about which we may
justly feel ambivalence-it is related to the tendency to
distinguish between the "worthy" and the "unworthy"
poor- but it is nonetheless a feature of American
civilization that policy-makers and citizens accept. And for
these reasons, and the costs, it is probable that Congress
would refuse to expand the Social Security system to
include single parents.

Conclusion
We have looked at many different schemes to assure
adequate support for children living with a single parent.
Some are appealing but all have problems. If we try to
collect from the noncustodial parent after separation, we
find that we must either use distasteful means, such as the
threat of jail. or cumbersome ones, such as universal and
mandatory wage assignments. Insurance schemes to collect
from parents before the insured event have no fewer
administrative problems and suffer from the additional
difficulty of forcing us to define the persons who are going
to be compelled to make payments into a fund whether or
not they receive any return. I personally am drawn to the
mandatory wage-assignment idea because it spares us the
politically touchy task of defining who, besides already
separated parents, shall contribute while at the same time
offering an opportunityilargely to eliminate the need to rely
on jail as an instrument of enforcement. Moreover, unlike
the various pay-in-advance insurance schemes, the wageassignment system retains whatever psychological benefit
may accrue to the parents and to the child from knowing
that the absent parent is making current and substantial
financial contributions for the child.
There is another alternative to the heavy use of jail or to
mandatory wage assignments. Weaker than either, but
politically feasible , it is simply for states to create efficient
full-time collection and enforcement offices, comparable to
Friends of the Court, with courts empowered to use
sentences to jail but rarely actually doing so. To those to
whom jail is repugnant or at least distasteful. this is a
possible middle ground that would almost certainly lead to
much higher collections in the many places where mothers
not receiving welfare are now left to inadequate private
remedies.
Even if one of the more audacious schemes were adopted,
however, one fundamental limit needs to be kept in mind.
Like the current system, neither mandatory wage
assignments nor any of the insurance schemes alone will
provide an income that will permit custodial parents and
children to survive at anywhere near the standard of living
they maintained when the family was intact. Recall that
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child support for a parent taking care of two children is
typically set at 33 percent of the noncustodial parent's net
earnings, but that the custodial parent needs around 80
percent of the family's former total income to maintain the
prior standard of living. We have also seen that it is not
feasible to demand dramatically higher percentages of
earnings to be paid by the noncustodial parent. While
insurance schemes could be tailored to provide higher
benefits simply by raising the premiums, premiums high
enough to assure a parent of young children a standard of
living equal to what he or she had before would be
considered prohibitively expensive. Even under the Social
Security system today, the goal for the disabled or the aged
is to meet 60 percent, not 100 percent, of their prior level of
earnings.
Thus, regardless of the system devised, custodians of
small children must either adjust to a significant decline in
income or, as we have discussed much earlier, find either
high-paying work or a new spouse. None of these choices
may seem palatable, but they will continue to be the ones
that have to be made. Public officials worried about the
financial plight of parents, especially the plight of mothers
with young children, will need to devote as much attention
to improving employment opportunities for women-and
for the population generally-as they do to finding new .
ways to collect child support. And even if they succeed,
they will not cure the dilemma for many single parents of
choosing between full-time work and full-time parenting.
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